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USING EXCESS IVF BLASTOCYSTS FOR
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH:
DEVELOPING ETHICAL DOCTRINE, SECULAR
AND RELIGIOUS
GerardMagill, Ph.D.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ethics can be an uncomfortable field when faced with astounding
breakthroughs in scientific research that could change the face of
medicine. The sequencing of the human genome in the Human Genome
Project that started in 1990 was effectively completed at the turn of this
millennium.1 Subsequent discoveries about many gene traits have
substantively ensconced values discourse into the molecular landscape
of the human condition. Closely related to the importance of gene
discoveries was the achievement in 1998 of isolating and cultivating
human embryonic stem cells ("hESCs"). 2 The discovery of this
technique occurred over twenty-five years ago in mice and over ten
years ago in primates. 3 These marvels raise complex ethical dilemmas
for scientists who seek to develop a multitude of treatments and
therapies for a plethora of diseases and debilities. Many examples of the
high hopes for hESC research could be provided, such as hESCs
possibly soon becoming a resource of hematopoietic cells whose
transplantation today provides the most likely pathway to cure many
Vernon F. Gallagher Chair, Center for Healthcare Ethics, Duquesne University.
1. Eric S. Lander et al., Int'l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Sequencing

*

and Analysis of the Human Genome, 409 NATURE 860, 862-63 (2001); J. Craig Venter et al., The

Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1304, 1305-06 (2001).
2. See Michael J. Shamblott et al., Derivation of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Cultured
Human PrimordialGerm Cells, 95 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S.A. 13726, 13729-30 (1998); James

A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts, 282 SCIENCE
1145, 1145 (1998).
3. Anthony C.F. Perry, Progressin Human Somatic-CellNuclear Transfer, 353 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 87, 88 (2005).
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diseases. 4 This Article focuses upon a particularly complex debate
around the ethical legitimacy of hESC research. The timeliness of this
debate is manifested by the Executive Order of President Barack Obama
on March 9, 2009 to permit federal funding for embryonic stem cell
("ESC") research, revoking the prior Executive Order of President
George W. Bush on August 9, 2001 that limited such funding.
The focus of this analysis is to apply the ethical imagination to
overcome a specific roadblock against a particular aspect of this research
that significantly curtails scientific progress in this fast-moving field.
The roadblock pertains to a conservative doctrine upheld by both secular
and religious policy to prevent the use of excess embryos created by in
vitro fertilization ("IVF") at fertility clinics.6 There are approximately
400,000 excess IVF frozen embryos in the United States.7 The problem
presented by this roadblock is increased in light of the large number of
fertility clinics, a number that has mushroomed over the years.8 Excess
IVF embryos in fertility clinics are a much desired source for hESC
research. 9 This Article focuses upon using these unwanted and frozen
embryos, often referred to as "excess embryos."' 0 And the word "use" or
"using" is not meant to convey a merely utilitarian calculation; rather, it
is adopted to convey the meaning of "making available" conditional
upon appropriate ethical justification. This specific discussion, including
the moral status of the human embryo, 1 fits into a much larger debate on
the ethics of embryo use.' 2
4. See Edward A. Copelan, Hematopoietic Stem-Cell Transplantation, 354 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1813, 1820 (2006).

5. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 46 (Mar. 9, 2009).
6. See, e.g., Susan Okie, Stem-Cell Research--Signposts and Roadblocks, 353 NEW ENG. J.

MED. 1, 1, 5 (2005) (discussing President George W. Bush's veto of federal funding for expanded
stem cell research); Michael J. Sandel, Embryo Ethics-The Moral Logic of Stem Cell Research,

351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 207, 207 (2004) (summarizing the debate against stem cell research and
noting that some base their opposition to stem cell research on religious beliefs).
7. David I. Hoffman et al., Cyropreserved Embryos in the United States and Their
A vailabilityforResearch, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 1066 (2003); Okie, supra note 6, at 3.

8. Franco Furger & Francis Fukuyama, A Proposal for Modernizing the Regulation of
Human Biotechnologies, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 2007, at 16, 16.
9. See Okie, supra note 6, at 3.
10. See, e.g., Ger P.A. Bongaerts & Rend S.V.M. Severijnen, Stem Cells from Residual IVFEmbryos-Continuation of Life Justifies Isolation, 69 MED. HYPOTHESES 478, 478 (2007)

(describing the most common source of hESCs as "excess human embryos from IVF treatments");
Debora Spar, The Business of Stem Cells, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 211, 211 (2004) (using the term
"excess embryos" in reference to the type of embryos permitted for use in stem cell research in
Canada).
11. See Bonnie Steinbock, Moral Status, Moral Value, and Human Embryos: Implicationsfor
Stem Cell Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BIOETHICS 416, 417, 420-32 (Bonnie
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To comprehend the trajectory of this Article, it is helpful to grasp a
threefold connection: how this doctrine arises from a traditional ethical
principle and entails a prudential assumption. The analysis seeks to
develop this doctrine in a cautious manner by acceding to the prudential
assumption and engaging complementary traditional ethical principles.
The conservative doctrine being considered here is the opposition to
using spare IVF embryos for hESC research. The traditional ethical
principle is respect for human life that upholds human dignity from the
secular perspective of having personal status and from the religious
perspective of having a soul. 13 And the difficulty of maintaining
society's ethical integrity should not be underestimated given the pace of
development in biotechnology today. 14 The prudential assumption here
is that human life should be treated as personal-hence, being inviolable
in secular terms-or as having a soul from its inception, with
ensoulment being a religious connotation. That is, insofar as the
presence of personal life or a soul cannot be demonstrated at an
embryo's inception, that presence should be asserted out of maximum
caution-as a prudential assumption. And it is important to note that the
secular debate about defending the early cellular development of human
life as personal is akin to the religious debate about recognizing the early
cellular development of human life as having a soul. Hence, for the
purpose of consistency, this Article engages the secular and religious
debate by rhetorically referring to the personal soul.
However, dispute over this prudential assumption continues
unabated in bioethics discourse. 15 In other words, applying this ethical
Steinbock ed., 2007) (describing various views of the moral status of an embryo based on biological
humanity, personhood, possession of interest, and the view that an embryo has a "future-like-ours").
See generally Glenn C. Graber, The Moral Status of Gametes and Embryos: Storage and Surrogacy,
in HEALTH CARE ETHICS: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY 61 (Eileen E. Morrison ed., 2d

ed. 2009) (discussing different theories behind affording moral status to reproductive materials).
12.

See generally Louis M. GUENIN, THE MORALITY OF EMBRYO USE (2008) (thoroughly

discussing the ESC debate, including arguments centered on the moral rights of an embryo).
13. See Adam Schulman, Bioethics and the Question of Human Dignity, in HUMAN DIGNITY
AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 3, 6-15
(2008) (describing the concept of human dignity as arising from several different sources, including
the Bible, philosophical theories, constitutions, and international declarations).
14.

See MICHAEL HAUSKELLER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE INTEGRITY OF LIFE: TAKING

PUBLIC FEARS SERIOUSLY 19-27 (2007) (discussing the need to maintain ethical integrity and
respect for life in the face of advances in the field of genetic engineering).
15.

See, e.g., CYNTHIA B. COHEN, RENEWING THE STUFF OF LIFE: STEM CELLS, ETHICS, AND

PUBLIC POLICY 59-109 (2007) (describing the stem cell research debate from the secular and
religious perspectives); David DeGrazia, Must We Have Full Moral Status Throughout Our
Existence? A Reply to Alfonso Gdmez-Lobo, 17 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 297, 301-06 (2007)
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principle and prudential assumption supports the conservative doctrine:
To respect the embryo as a subject with a personal soul, as an end in
itself, the embryo should not be treated merely as a means or as an
object. Hence, the embryo should be protected from intentional killing
17
or destruction,' 6 even when pursuing noble goals in medical research.
The purpose of this Article is to explain how a cautious development of
this doctrine can shift the outcome from opposing to supporting the use
of excess IVF embryos for hESC research. The analysis develops the
doctrine in a cautious manner by acceding to the prudential assumption
and supporting the traditional ethical principle, thereby respecting life
from its inception, and also by applying two complementary traditional
ethical principles.
From the outset the problem should be delineated clearly. When
IVF embryos are created in fertility clinics, typically the result is
creating more embryos than required by a prospective mother for
reproduction. The excess IVF embryos could be used for hESC research,
and many laboratories would like to do so. 18 But substantive opposition
is encountered due to the unavoidable destruction of the ex utero embryo
when harvesting the hESCs. The technique of harvesting these cells is
now well established: The cells are derived from the inner cell mass
("ICM") of an embryo that has developed into the blastocyst stage,
typically around five days after fertilization, and the process destroys the
embryo. 19

(exploring different rationales for affording a fetus moral status); Katrien Devolder & John Harris,
The Ambiguity of the Embryo: EthicalInconsistency in the Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, in

STEM CELL RESEARCH: THE ETHICAL ISSUES 16, 26 (Lori Gruen et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the
debate between those who believe embryos should be used for "morally important purposes" and
those who feel embryos should be protected as human life).
16. See TED PETERS, THE STEM CELL DEBATE 29-38 (2007); Sandel, supra note 6, at 207.
17. ROBERT P. GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE OF HUMAN LIFE
17 (2008); see Paul R. McHugh, Zygote and "Clonote "-TheEthical Use of Embryonic Stem Cells,

351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 209, 209 (2004).
18. See Xin Zhang et al., Derivation of Human Embryonic Stem Cells from Developing and
Arrested Embryos, 24 STEM CELLS 2669, 2669 (2006).

19. For discussion of these concepts, see RUSSELL KOROBKIN WITH STEPHEN R. MUNZER,
STEM CELL CENTURY: LAW AND POLICY FOR A BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGY 34 (2007)

(describing a five-day-old embryo as a blastocyst); Michal Amit & Joseph Itskovitz-Eldor,
Isolation, Characterization,and Maintenance of Primate ES Cells, in ESSENTIALS OF STEM CELL

BIOLOGY 275, 275 (Robert Lanza et al. eds., 2006) (explaining that ESCs can be "isolated from the
inner cell mass (1CM) of the blastocyst"); Donald W. Landry & Howard A. Zucker, Embryonic
Death and the Creation of Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 114 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1184,

1184 ("[L]ive human embryos must be destroyed in the process of creating stem cells.").
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Despite the robust opposition to using IVF embryos for hESC
research, plausible arguments have been offered to justify the practice.
One rationale might be described as a practical usefulness argument. The
excess frozen embryos are destined to die because they are unwanted for
procreative purposes and cannot survive endlessly in cryopreservation.
Hence, perhaps some good use to benefit humankind should accrue from
these embryos that are otherwise destined to perish. This perspective is
similar to what some call the "nothing is lost" principle. 20 A related
rationale might be construed as a compassionate argument. There are
vast populations of diseased, debilitated, or terminally ill patients who
could benefit or survive from the future development of ESC treatments.
Hence, perhaps there is a duty to use this extraordinarily limited but
significantly promising resource of excess frozen embryos to make an
immensely valuable contribution to assist so many needy in society.2 1
And finally, there is a related rationale that might be construed as a
noble cause argument. Immense hope is offered for medical treatments,
therapies, and cures through ESC research.22 Indeed, despite charges of
hype over realism, the accomplishments of research in this fledgling
field in its first decade are astounding, recognizing of course that a lot
more time is needed for these endeavors to offer reliable interventions. 3
Hence, this argument suggests that perhaps research on excess IVF
embryos should be permitted for the noble cause of human flourishing,
which appears to be a broader argument than assisting sick patients.2 4
These rationales elicit expansive support from different and overlapping
constituencies. Yet, conservative secular and religious doctrine is not
20. Gene Outka, The Ethics of Human Stem Cell Research, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 175,
193 (2002).
21. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 4; see also KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 19, at
232-42 (telling the story of a young girl whose parents conceived her brother through in vitro
fertilization so that stem cells from his umbilical cord could be given to his sister, who was
suffering from a genetic disorder, and examining the ethical concerns involved in the intentional
creation of stem cell donors).
22. See, e.g., David M. Panchision, Repairing the Nervous System with Stem Cells, in
REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 35, 40-42 (2006) (describing how stem cells have the potential to treat
spinal cord injuries, brain trauma, and neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's and
Huntington's); Philip H. Schwartz & Peter J. Bryant, Therapeutic Uses of Stem Cells, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE STEM CELL DEBATE 37, 38-46 (Kristen Renwick Monroe et al. eds., 2008)

(an overview of the current application of stem cell therapy towards blood and immune disorders,
retinal degeneration, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease).
23. Panchision, supra note 22, at 42.
24. See Gerard Magill, Science, Ethics, and Policy: RelatingHuman Genomics to Embryonic
Stem-Cell Research and Therapeutic Cloning, in GENETICS AND ETHICS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY

STUDY 253, 260 (Gerard Magill ed., 2004).
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persuaded by these arguments and continues to oppose the destruction of
excess IVF embryos for hESC research. There are several ways to
engage such opposition in a scholarly manner: to agree with it, to
disagree with it, or to further develop it in a constructive manner while
retaining its central insight. This Article follows the latter trajectory,
adopting a hermeneutical or interpretative approach.
II.

HERMENEUTICS AND ETHICS

The specifics of this doctrine can be illustrated by the opposition of
former President George W. Bush (the secular dimension),2 6 as well as
the opposition of some influential faith traditions (the religious
dimension)., 7 The term "doctrine" is adopted in this Article to convey a
policy stance, both secular and religious. The policy stance can be
construed as a "doctrine" in the sense that its assertion requires belief in
its truth claim insofar as it can be explained coherently, although not in a
probative manner. It is important to emphasize that by adopting the term
"doctrine," the analysis intends to critique this policy stance in a
constructive manner and not in a deprecatory way. In other words, many
secular and religious policies that govern daily life are coherent,
plausible, and constructive but cannot be logically demonstrated or
proven. Such doctrines are based on deeper assumptions-secular belief
assumptions or religious faith assumptions-that have a pervasive and
persuasive influence even though they may turn out to be capable of
subsequently developing. And this critical relation between truth claims
and deeper assumptions has fostered the exciting enterprise of
hermeneutics in many different fields-for example, from legal

25.

See, e.g., CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS

PERSONAE ON CERTAIN BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS
§§ 31-32 (2008), available at
http://www.usccb.org/comm/Dignitaspersonae/Dignitas-Personae.pdf [hereinafter CONGREGATION,
DIGNITAS PERSONAE] (stating that in vitro fertilization and the intentional destruction of embryos is
against the Catholic faith); GEORGE & TOLLEFSEN, supra note 17, at 194-99 (arguing that the
destruction of excess embryos constitutes the destruction of potential life, despite any benefits such
research may provide).
26. See President George W. Bush, Address on Federal Funding of Embryonic Stem-Cell
Research (Aug. 9, 2001), in 31 ORIGINS 213, 214 (200 1); see also Gerard Magill, The Ethics Weave
in Human Genomics, Embryonic Stem Cell Research, and Therapeutic Cloning: Promoting and

ProtectingSociety's Interests, 65 ALB. L. REv. 701, 720-21 (2002) (summarizing President Bush's
policy banning federal funding of research that involved the future destruction of human embryos).
27. See CONGREGATION, DIGNITAS PERSONAE, supra note 25, §§ 31-32.
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interpretation and literary criticism to philosophy, psychology, and
religion.28
This observation on hermeneutics leads to another reason for
adopting the word "doctrine" in this Article. Religious doctrine is
commonly understood as presenting substantive truth claims that are
justifiably interpreted in different ways over time in a manner that
actually changes their meaning. This cautious process of justified change
in traditional religious faith is referred to as the development of doctrine
or doctrinal development. 29 This crucially important interpretative or
hermeneutical approach to doctrine permits its meaning to develop
across generations and cultures. Moreover, this hermeneutical approach
can shed significant light on whether and how the conservative doctrine
opposing hESC research might be open to such development.
This Article's argument pursues this approach of hermeneutics by
applying the ethical imagination. Ethical imagination means an
intellectual process that tries to infer conclusions from converging data
rather than from merely deductive logic. 30 For example, when couples
fall in love and marry, the discernment process tends not to result merely
from deductive logic-though that has a place-but appears to be a
function of their imagination that constructively interprets the entire
range of relevant data in an integrative manner cumulating to a
conclusion.
The cumulative character of converging argument in this Article,
applying the ethical imagination, occurs by combining two traditional
ethical principles to support using excess IVF embryos for hESC
research in constructive tension with the traditional ethical principle of
respecting human life that opposes this research. And the outcome is to
conclude that the shift from opposing to supporting the research can be
construed as a development rather than a mere rejection of the
conservative doctrine. The purpose of appealing to converging
arguments using the ethical imagination here is to justify a cautious

28. On the tension between secular reason and religious faith in hermeneutics, see generally
Gerard Magill & Marie D. Hoff, Introduction: Public Conversation on Values, in VALUES AND
PUBLIC LIFE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY I (Gerard Magill & Marie D. Hoff eds., 1995). For an
exploration of the reason-faith hermeneutics to stem cell research, see Ralph Charbonnier, The
Contribution of the ProtestantChurch in Germany to the PluralistDiscourse in Bioethics: The Case
of Stem Cell Research, 14 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 95, 100-04 (2008).
29. For a thorough discussion of the creation of religious doctrine, see generally JOHN HENRY
CARDINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (1960).
30. See Brian Devlin & Gerard Magill, The Process of Ethical Decision Making, 20 BEST
PRAC. & RES. CLINICAL ANAESTHESIOLOGY 493, 497-98 (2006).
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development of this conservative doctrine. The analysis confirms the
traditional ethical principle that underlies this doctrine and also
considers complementary traditional ethical principles to explain how
the conservative doctrine might properly develop. So, the hermeneutical
endeavor here is not to submit a progressive or liberal argument against
the traditional ethical principle underlying this conservative doctrine.
Rather, the hermeneutical enterprise is to appeal to complementary
conservative ethical principles that have widespread secular and
religious acceptance in our society to explain how this conservative
doctrine can develop legitimately.
The quest of this hermeneutical endeavor is to explain that the
doctrine of President Bush-that is, the secular perspective-and some
influential faith traditions-the religious perspective-can be developed
constructively and cautiously. The development entails a move from
vigorously opposing to strenuously supporting hESC research using
excess IVF embryos. While this shift appears dramatic in the sense of
seeming to adopt a polar opposite position, in fact the change is indeed
developmental, as the acorn to the oak tree. The nuance is to explain
how to safeguard the fundamental insight in the doctrine that opposes
this research while also embracing a contrasting position by applying
complementary ethical principles that are likewise traditional. So, the
outcome is to justify the use of excess IVF embryos for hESC research
by applying complementary ethical principles, thereby generating a
contrasting development of doctrine. And it is fascinating to ascertain
how the traditional doctrine of opposition need not be discarded in the
process of justifying a developed doctrine that offers support for using
excess IVF embryos for hESC research.
Finally, the significance of this outcome may be far-reaching, not
only in permitting the identified research to occur with all of its promise
for medical breakthroughs but also in placing the influence and
plausibility of conservative secular and religious doctrine behind the
research. The potential for a myriad of treatments, therapies, and cures
arising from hESC research is worthy of uniting a nation in a common
pursuit with widespread support. This posture can avoid the entrenched
tension between progressive and conservative perspectives that all too
often hamstring policy debates and thereby delay the much sought relief
that medical science can bring to so many suffering patients. This
optimistic quest seeks to overcome the unfortunate delay in progress that
became ensconced so quickly in both secular and religious policy after
the initial discovery of how to harvest and cultivate ESCs.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss2/4
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III.

DISCOVERY AND DELAY

The amazing discovery of how to isolate and harvest ESCs
occurred just a decade ago, in 1998.31 But by 2001, secular and religious
doctrine had asserted their ethical reservations to effectively delay the
fast-paced research in this fascinating new field. After discovering how
to manipulate ESCs, vigorous opposition was voiced by some religious
traditions.32 And in the secular domain, President Bill Clinton initially
adopted the recommendations of his National Bioethics Advisory
Commission.33 In August 2001, President Bush restricted the use of
federal funding for hESC research to a specific number of previously
developed hESC lines.34 This meant that if researchers had funding from
other sources to undertake hESC research, they could not conduct their
studies using labs or equipment paid for by federal funding, such as by
the National Institutes of Health. 35 Naturally, this policy placed
significant constraints on the business success of United States stem cell
laboratories in the globalized context of this research.36 Congress
attempted to reverse President Bush's policy, 37 but it remained in effect
until March 9, 2009, when President Obama issued an Executive Order
to permit federal funding of ESC research, revoking the previous

31. Junying Yu & James A. Thomson, Embryonic Stem Cells, in REGENERATIVE MEDICINE,
supra note 22, at 1, 3.
32. See generally Richard M. Doerflinger, The Ethics of Funding Embryonic Stem Cell
Research: A Catholic Viewpoint, 9 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 137 (1999) (describing the Catholic
perspective of stem cell research); Margaret A. Farley, Roman Catholic Views on Research
Involving Human Embryonic Stem Cells, in 3 ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH
D-3 (2000) (discussing the Catholic position on ESC research); INT'L ASS'N OF CATHOLIC
BIOETHICISTS, STATEMENT ON REGENERATIVE MEDICINE AND STEM CELL RESEARCH, in 8 NAT'L

CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 328, 334-38 (2008) (explaining the Catholic belief that every embryo is a
"potential human being" and thus should not be used in stem cell research).
33. See National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem
Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976, 51,977 (Aug. 25, 2000); see also NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY
COMM'N, I ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH 68-81 (1999) (listing the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission's thirteen recommendations for federal funding of ESCs that were
adopted by President Clinton).
34. Bush, supranote 26, at 214.
35. Elizabeth G. Phimister, A TetraploidTwist on the Embryonic Stem Cell, 353 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1646,1647 (2005).
36. See Spar, supra note 10, at 211-12.
37. See Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 810, 109thCong. (2005).
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Executive Order of President Bush
in 2001.38 And similar debates have
39
internationally.
been occurring
These circumstances depict the common tension between science
and ethics: the tension between the vigorous progress of scientific
research that seeks new discoveries and the cautious concern of
traditional doctrine, secular and religious alike, that defends longstanding traditional ethical perspectives. While the tension between
science and ethics need not be confrontational and controversial, often it
is, and the debate over hESC research certainly exemplifies the latter.40
The hope of this analysis is to explain that the tension between science
and ethics on hESC research can be constructive and conciliatory. To
accomplish this outcome, the coherence and plausibility of the
prudential assumption underlying the conservative doctrine needs to be
considered.
IV.

THE PRUDENTIAL ASSUMPTION

The basic ethical conundrum being engaged here is trying to square
the amazing promise of hESC research for medical science with the
necessity of having to destroy a human embryo, a blastocyst, in the
process of harvesting the stem cells. The profound ethical concern that
arises with hESC research deals with protecting the human blastocyst
from its inception as personal human life. That is, the concern is that we
should not destroy personal human life even for the most promising
medical research. 4' While this stance prima facie is appealing, it
encounters significant challenges. The analysis begins by considering
what it means to claim that the very early cellular development of human
life is unambiguously personal. Then the analysis will explain that even
if we can assume or accede to the claim that human life is personal from
its inception, it does not necessarily follow that early cellular
development, of which destruction is unavoidable in harvesting stem
cells, in absolutely no circumstances can be used for hESC research.

38. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 46 (Mar. 9, 2009).
39. See generally LeRoy Walters, Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Intercultural
Perspective, 14 KENNEDY INST, ETHICS J. 3 (2004) (summarizing views of ESC research in a variety

of cultures).
40. See, e.g., PATRICK LEE & ROBERT P. GEORGE, BODY-SELF DUALISM IN CONTEMPORARY
ETHICS AND POLITICS 122-40 (2008).
41. See generally COHEN, supra note 15, at 59-109 (discussing the secular and religious
reasons to protect human embryos).
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These two issues demarcate the foundation and the substance of the
ethical argument presented in this Article.
The prudential assumption and the traditional ethical principle of
respecting life encompasses a long-standing debate about the ethical
obligation to protect the early cellular development of human life from
its inception. The long-standing debate includes several contested issues
that need to be considered. The prudential assumption deals with a
question that merging secular and religious terminology might be
phrased in this way: Is it warranted to construe early cellular human life
as having a personal soul?
There is widespread recognition that no one can demonstrate when
a personal soul enters the early cellular development of human life.
Philosophy, theology, and science are at a loss for demonstrative proof
about this highly significant claim. For example, traditional religious
doctrine recognizes that "no experimental datum can be in itself
sufficient to bring us to the recognition of a spiritual soul" and hence
Roman Catholic official teaching "has not expressly committed itself to
an affirmation of a philosophical nature" about the presence of a
personal soul in early human life even though that teaching protects
human life as personal from its inception.42 Hence, asserting the claim
appears to be based on the following assumption as a function of
prudence. Given the importance of the generally agreed upon stance that
early human life with a personal soul should not be readily destroyed,
and given the apparent impossibility of adequately demonstrating when
early human life develops or receives a personal soul, 4 3 then it seems
prudent to assume that early human life has a personal soul from the
earliest or safest point which is its inception. This prudential
discernment results from recognizing that while empirical data cannot
prove the existence of a personal soul, there is sufficient scientific
research that seems to provide "a valuable indication"--though short of
demonstrative proof--"for discerning by the use of reason a personal
presence at the moment of this first appearance of a human life." 44 This
prudential assumption basically construes the early cellular development
42. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE (DONUM
VITAE) § 1.1 (1987), available at http://helpersbrooklynny.org/Donum%20Vitae.pdf [hereinafter
CONGREGATION, DONUM VITAE]; see also JOHN PAUL I1,
ENCYCLICAL LETTER: EVANGELIUM VITAE

60 (1995), available at http://www.catholic-pages.com/documents/evangelium vitae.pdf (stating
that a new life begins at the moment an egg is fertilized).
43. See, e.g., JOHN PAUL II, supra note 42,1 60 ("[T]he presence of a spiritual soul cannot be
ascertained by empirical data ...").
44. CONGREGATION, DONUM VITAE, supranote 42, § 1.
1.
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of human life as personal and hence worthy of protection from its
inception. However, the long-standing debate over this prudential
assumption has been met with substantive skepticism that can be
articulated in the following points.
The first point addresses the question of a personal soul in the
process of embryo division and embryo combination.45 In natural human
reproduction, a single embryo, after developing to the blastocyst stage,
can divide, thereby becoming identical twins. 46 This division presents a
conundrum for the position that upholds conception as the point for
construing the presence of a personal soul. The obvious question is how
one embryo with a personal soul can lead to the emergence of another in
the twin-with the unambiguous corollary that the emergence of the
twin's personal soul occurs after conception, at the point of twinning.
Moreover, science also indicates that two independently conceived
blastocysts-fraternal rather than identical twins-can fuse before the
formation of the primitive streak (around fourteen days) and
implantation in the womb. 47 This fusion creates one embryo that is a sort
of chimera of the cells with the different genomes of the original twins.4 8
The obvious question here is how two embryos, each construed as
having a personal soul from conception, can recombine into one embryo
with presumably one personal soul as evidently appears to be so after
birth. It seems appropriate to inquire about what happens to the other
personal soul of the no-longer-existing twin after the fusion of their
different "bodies" (as blastocysts). The second point addresses the
meaning of the low ratio of conception to birth for construing the
presence of personal souls. Science indicates that more than half of
fertilized eggs are lost, thereby not resulting in birth, 49 and some
estimate the percentage of loss could be as high as two-thirds.5
Perhaps the third point is the most important one to bear in mind.
The meaning of the prudential assumption about the personal soul is that
the assumption is indeed only prudential in the sense that it can change
based on new data. Given insufficient data to identify when a personal
45. For a discussion of embryotic combination, see generally Kurt Benirschke, Spontaneous
Chimerism in Mammals: A CriticalReview, 51 CURRENT TOPiCS PATHOLOGY 1 (1970).
46. See Okie, supra note 6, at 3.
47. Id.
48. See Benirschke, supranote 45, at 3.
49. Sandel, supra note 6, at 208.
50. See HENRI LERIDON, HUMAN FERTILITY: THE BASIC CoMPoNENTs 79 (Judith F. Helzner

trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1977) (1973); D. Keith Edmonds, Early Embryonic Mortality in Women,
38 FERTILITY & STERILITY 447, 451 (1982).
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soul begins, the earliest point for such protection being the inception of
human life can make sense. Yet that prudential assumption is open to
change if new scientific information emerges. Indeed, such data was
discovered in late 2007, using a new process called direct nuclear
51
reprogramming to create induced pluripotent stem cells ("iPSCs").
Scientists discovered this process in the wake of successful mouse
experiments,52 and found that direct reprogramming enabled human skin
cells to be turned into iPSCs, which resemble and behave like ESCs,
though the two are genetically different from each other.53
An immediate reaction from conservative voices was to applaud the
breakthrough as possibly side-stepping the need to harvest ESCs in a
manner that destroys the human embryo. 4 However, very quickly an
implication emerged that could cause consternation for these voices.
Another laboratory used the technique in mouse experiments to develop
a mouse fetus from the iPSCs. 5 That experiment demonstrated that by
using the new technique it may be possible to develop a human fetus
from human iPSCs. The critical point was the apparent discovery that
any human cell through direct nuclear reprogramming as an iPSC, with
the provision of a placenta and a womb, could become a human fetus,
akin to the natural process of fertilization and conception. 6
This dramatic new biological information raises a crucial question
about the prudential assumption over the presence of a personal soul.
Two clear options are apparent. First, if the prudential assumption is
adopted, protecting human life as having a personal soul from its
inception, it could be argued that iPSCs, given the capability of
developing into a fetus, should be protected as potentially having a
personal soul. The prudential assumption requires that human life should
be protected as having a personal soul from its inception. Second,
51. See Kazutoshi Takahashi et al., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cellsfrom Adult Human
Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861, 861-63, 868 (2007); Junying Yu et al., Induced
PluripotentStem Cell Lines Derivedfrom Human Somatic Cells, 318 SCIENCE 1917, 1917 (2007).
52. See Marius Wemig et al., In vitro Reprogramming of Fibroblasts into a Pluripotent EScell-like State, 448 NATURE 318, 322-23 (2007) (discussing the results of a study in which mouse
cells were reprogrammed into pluripotent cells).
53. See Takahashi et al., supra note 51, at 862-63.
54. See W. Malcolm Byrnes, Direct Reprogramming and Ethics in Stem Cell Research,
8 NAT'L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 277, 285 (2008); Maureen L. Condic & Edward J. Furton, Harvesting
Embryonic Stem Cellsfrom Deceased Human Embryos, 7 NAT'L CATH. BIOETHICs Q. 507, 513-14
(2007).
55. Wemig et al., supranote 52, at 322.
56. Gerard Magill & William B. Neaves, Ontological and Ethical Implications of Direct
Nuclear Reprogramming,19 KENNEDY INST. ETHICs J. 23, 25 (2009).
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consistency would require applying that assumption now to include
iPSCs. But that stance, though consistent, may stretch the plausibility of
the assumption a step too far by inferring that every cell in the human
body through direct reprogramming could have a personal soul. So
perhaps this new data provides sufficient biological information to
challenge the coherence of the prudential assumption. In other words,
that challenge would be premised upon the improbability that every
human cell could be manipulated using this technique in a manner that
entailed having a personal soul. So, this new data may suggest that the
inception of cellular development in human life may not be an
appropriate point to construe the presence of a personal soul-though
the data do not indicate when such a point might be.57
This discovery of iPSCs provides further reason to be skeptical
about the prudential assumption stated above. In other words, the
prudential assumption must be responsive to the discovery of new
scientific knowledge about the early cellular development of human life.
Nonetheless, the argument in this Article accedes to the prudential
assumption to cautiously present an ethically conservative but
alternative position. This analysis simply documents the skepticism
about the prudential assumption but does not embrace that skepticism to
make the critical argument herein. Rather, by acceding to the prudential
assumption, this Article explains how to develop conservative doctrine
from opposing to supporting the use of spare IVF embryos for hESC
research.
V.

DEVELOPING DOCTRINE

After addressing the foundational question about a personal soul,
the substantive argument in this Article can be pursued in the following
way. If the human blastocyst should be safeguarded from its inception as
personal human life, as acceded to here, does it follow that using excess
IVF embryos for hESC research should be forbidden? The secular and
religious doctrine, aligned with President Bush and some faith traditions,
58
indicates that such a proscription is ethically appropriate. However, a
different approach can be pursued by arguing that complementary
ethical principles can be deployed to actually provide support for this
research. Here, complementary principles refer to other traditional
57. See id. at 26-30.
58.

See CONGREGATION, DIGNITAS PERSONAE, supra note 25, § 32; GEORGE & TOLLEFSEN,

supra note 17, at 194-99.
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principles that are consistent with but distinct from the traditional ethical
principle of respecting human life from its inception. This alternative
approach seeks to move from proscribing this practice to permitting this
practice. Such a shift from proscription to permission might appear as a
rejection of the conservative doctrine with its prudential assumption. But
the analysis suggests that supporting this practice can occur while
acceding to the prudential assumption. Hence, this Article talks of
developing doctrine, not of rejecting it.
There are two conservative ethical principles involved in this
alternative approach: the ethical principle of letting some patients die
when struggling with a terminal condition, hereafter referred to as the
ethical principle of letting die; and the ethical principle of harvesting
organs and tissues from deceased individuals for transplant purposes,
hereafter referred to as the ethical principle of harvesting after death. For
example, on the principle of letting die, the Jewish bioethicist Aaron L.
Mackler notes that Catholic and Jewish traditions permit refusal of
medical interventions in end of life care when they "are excessively
burdensome or lacking benefit., 59 And on the principle of harvesting
after death, the Catholic bioethicist Kevin D. O'Rourke notes that
harvesting for transplanting after death in itself "presents no ethical
problem., 60 An explanation of each of these principles is provided in the
subsequent two Parts. The argument that is pursued seeks to combine
both ethical principles to reach a point of convergence that enables them,
by working together, to justify the practice of using IVF embryos for
hESC research. But there are significant hurdles to be crossed in
justifying such an approach, which are discussed in relation to the
argument's framework.
Briefly, the argument follows this framework. On the one hand, the
principle of letting patients die from a terminal condition can be adopted
to justify letting excess IVF embryos thaw from cryopreservation. This
principle accedes to the prudential assumption that human life from its
inception should be protected from destruction. This prudential principle
does not contradict the ethical justification of letting patients die from a
terminal condition, such as by withdrawing life-sustaining measures.
Likewise, the principle of letting die can justify letting frozen embryos
thaw to die, thereby making them accessible to researchers as they thaw.
59. AARON L. MACKLER, INTRODUCTION TO JEWISH AND CATHOLIC BIOETHICS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 109 (2003).
60. BENEDICT M. ASHLEY & KEvIN D. O'ROuRKE, HEALTH CARE ETHICS: A THEOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 331 (4th ed. 1997).
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On the other hand, as they thaw, the frozen embryos can be useful for
hESC research by harvesting their ESCs in the dying process, akin to
adopting the ethical principle of harvesting from deceased individuals.
However, there are two substantive hurdles in this proposed
convergence of complementary traditional ethical principles. One hurdle
is that previously when embryos were frozen early in their development,
the ESCs had not yet developed. 61 The other hurdle is that the frozen
embryo does not have a brain, so the brain death criterion that is crucial
for harvesting tissues and organs from deceased children and adults does
not pertain.62 The analysis that follows seeks not only to scrutinize the
relevance of these two complementary traditional ethical principles that
elicit widespread support but also to overcome the hurdles identified if
the argument is to be persuasive.
VI.

ETHICAL PRINCIPLE OF LETTING DIE

The multitude of medical technologies that typify the delivery of
healthcare today has had a major impact on enabling patients to die well.
These technologies are especially important not only for secular
perspectives but also for perspectives in conservative faith traditions. In
religiously affiliated healthcare, these technologies include the practice
of pain management, palliative care, hospice care, and indeed the last
resort practice of terminal or palliative sedation, whereby unmanageable
pain justifies sedating a patient with a terminal condition into
unconsciousness until death.63 The shared ethical principle that underlies
all of these practices is that of justifiably letting patients die in
appropriate circumstances without eliciting the charge of killing or
murder. 64 This principle reflects a traditional stance in ethics that seeks

61. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
62. See Ronald B. Miller, EthicalIssues in Stem Cell Research, Therapy, and Public Policy,
26 WHITTIER L. REV. 845, 848 (2005).
63. DAVID F. KELLY, CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE ETHICS 139-42 (2004)
[hereinafter KELLY, CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC]; DAVID F. KELLY, MEDICAL CARE AT THE END OF

LIFE 19 (2006) [hereinafter KELLY, MEDICAL CARE]. See generally James J. Walter, Terminal
Sedation: A Catholic Perspective, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS: A CATHOLIC
PERSPECTIVE 225 (James J. Walter & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 2005) (discussing Roman Catholic
beliefs with regard to terminal sedation and distinguishing between terminal and palliative
sedation).
64. See, e.g., JOHN PAUL II, supra note 42, 65 ("To forego extraordinary or disproportionate
means is not the equivalent of suicide or euthanasia ... ").
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to respect human life as having a personal soul until the end of life. And
part of that respect is to avoid pain and suffering when feasible.65
The ethical principle of letting die is widely adopted in traditional
religious teaching and practice. The premise underlying this principle is
that "the life of the body in its earthly state is not an absolute good" that
would demand protection in every circumstance.66 Although euthanasia
is never permitted (understood as an "action or omission which of itself
and by intention causes death, with the purpose of eliminating all
suffering"), it is important to emphasize that "[e]uthanasia must be
forego.., medical
to
decision
the
from
distinguished
to any
disproportionate
now
are
by
they
because
...
either
procedures
on
the
expected results or because they impose an excessive burden
67
patient and his family." That is, "when death is clearly imminent and
inevitable, one can in conscience 'refuse forms of treatment that would
only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life.' ' 68 In
other words, in end of life care, "[t]o forego extraordinary 69or
disproportionate means is not the equivalent of suicide or euthanasia.,
of letting die is also widely adopted in secular
This ethical principle
7

policy and practice. 0 A substantive focus of court decisions over the

past decades has been on end of life care, in particular addressing
whether and when patients can be allowed to die from their underlying
terminal condition. And this history unveils the emergence and
prominence of ethics committees in healthcare facilities across the
United States.7 '
A brief review of this history can illustrate the widespread
acceptance of letting patients die from their terminal conditions.72
Initially, this principle engendered significant dispute and caused many
65.

See id

66. Id. 47.
67. Id 65.
68. Id. (quoting CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON
EUTHANASIA (IuRA ETBONA) § IV (1980)).
69. Id; see also U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS
DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 13 (4th ed. 2001) (stating that a person can
reject medical treatment that is not beneficial or extremely burdensome, but that suicide and
euthanasia are not "morally acceptable options").
70. See JERRY MENIKOFF, LAW AND BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 241-373 (2001)
(discussing United States Supreme Court and state court cases which establish the right of
terminally ill patients to refuse medical care).
71. Seeidat258.
72. See generally Dan W. Brock, Patient Competence and Surrogate Decision-Making, in
THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO MEDICAL ETHICS 128 (Rosamond Rhodes et al. eds., 2007) (discussing
informed consent and patient decisionmaking in medical care).
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cases to be presented for court resolution. At regular intervals from
1975, the courts built upon precedent decisions, establishing a consistent
outlook by applying the principle of letting die that has become such an
accepted ethical practice.73 Nonetheless, specific details in particular
cases continue to require the sophisticated analysis of case consultations
by ethics committee professionals.
The contentious debate over letting patients die assumed national
prominence in 1975 when Karen Ann Quinlan's case required legal
review over the question of withdrawing life-sustaining measures from a
patient in a persistent vegetative state.74 In 1976, the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the patient's right to refuse medical treatment as
a function of the right to privacy, as asserted by her father who was her
legal guardian.75 The case highlighted the substituted judgment standard
that has in part shaped this debate, leading to these conclusions: that an
individual's right could override state's interest in preserving life; and
that ethics committees should be used to address these dilemmas rather
than the courts.76 In the following year, in the case of Joseph Saikewicz,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts confirmed the patient's interest
over the State's interest to preserve life, focusing on informed consent
and the right to privacy.7 7 The case highlighted the "best interests"
standard that has also, in part, shaped the national debate since. In
1980, in the case of Eichner v. Dillon, the New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division supported removal of life-sustaining treatment based
on clear and convincing evidence of the patient's previously stated
preferences. 79 Then in the 1985 case of Claire Conroy, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey justified removal of life-sustaining measures based
on both the substituted judgment standard as a subjective standard and
the best interests standard as an objective standard, giving priority to the
former subjective standard when feasible insofar as it better reflected the
patient's previously indicated preferences.8 ° In the following year, the
case of Elizabeth Bouvia was adjudicated by the California Court of
Appeal to uphold a competent patient's right to request the removal of
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
1977).
78.
79.
80.

See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
See MENIKOFF, supra note 70, at 241-42.
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
Id. at 664, 668-69.
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427-28 (Mass.
Id.
Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 545-46 (App. Div. 1980).
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1227-33 (N.J. 1985).
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life-sustaining measures. 8 1 And in 1990, in the famous case of Nancy
Beth Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court upheld the State's
interest in requiring clear and convincing evidence of the patient's prior
stated preference to remove life-sustaining measures, evidence that was
provided subsequently to a lower court.82 And conservative faith
traditions adopted a similar posture that effectively followed the lead of
these secular court decisions,83 while at the same time upholding the
prudential assumption 84about respecting human life from inception as
having a personal soul.
This recent history of the traditional ethical principle of letting die
as pertains to the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures, an arena that
continues to elicit significant dispute, 85 sets the stage for applying the
principle of letting die to spare IVF embryos. What, then, is the
significance for hESC research of this ethical principle of letting patients
die? It is a principle that is so widely accepted as to be legitimately
construed as being a cautious principle, cautious in the sense of not
eliciting much dispute, 86 and a complementary principle, complementary
in the sense of being consistent with the traditional ethical principle of
respecting and protecting human life from its inception.87 The principle
of letting patients die involves several value-laden perspectives that
require scrutiny, as follows.
First, the principle affirms the respect due to each individual, as
having what has been discussed above as a personal soul, in the sense of
warranting protection from destruction, even for the noble cause of
medical research. Simply, this principle does not permit science to prey
upon dying patients even though their deceased bodies could be
81. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986).
82. Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990).
83. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 69, at 14. Specifically,
Directive 59 states that "[t]he free and informed judgment made by a competent adult patient
concerning the use or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures should always be respected and
normally complied with, unless it is contrary to Catholic moral teaching." Id. Thus, Directive 60
states that "Catholic health care institutions may never condone or participate in euthanasia or
assisted suicide in any way." Id.
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE TEXTBOOK OF BIOETHIcS 51-91 (Peter A. Singer & A.M.
Viens eds., 2008).
86. This caution is indicated in U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 69, at
13: "Only in this way are two extremes avoided: on the one hand, an insistence on useless or
burdensome technology even when a patient may legitimately wish to forgo it and, on the other
hand, the withdrawal of technology with the intention of causing death."
87. For example, "the duty to preserve life is not absolute, for we may reject life-prolonging
procedures that are insufficiently beneficial or excessively burdensome." Id.
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immensely useful for medical research. 8 Both secular and religious
perspectives share this stance. For example, in secular ethics, one of the
basic tenets of the ethical movement called principlism is that of respect
for the individual patient.89 And in religious discourse, respect for each
individual permeates all forms of care. 90 In particular, religious discourse
aligns respect for each person with being made in the image of God. Yet
that religious alignment does not stand against letting patients die in
appropriate circumstances. That religious perspective recognizes that
there is no duty to keep each patient alive at any cost in all
circumstances: "[T]he duty to preserve life is not absolute, for we may
reject life-prolonging procedures
that are insufficiently beneficial or
91
burdensome."
excessively
Second, the principle of letting die also acknowledges that the way
patients with a terminal condition end their lives is an important
reflection of the basic respect that is their due. Hence, the emergence of
movements for pain management, palliative care, hospice care, and the
practice of terminal or palliative sedation are mainstream fixtures in
healthcare facilities that care for dying patients. 92 For example, the
acceptance of the practice of sedating a patient whose pain is
unmanageable into unconsciousness until death, known as terminal or
palliative sedation, is justifiable from secular and religious perspectives
alike.93 That acceptance is based upon applying the principle of double
effect to explain that terminal or palliative sedation is legitimate insofar
as intending its use iswarranted when there is no other way to manage
the pain of a dying patient, even recognizing
that death is the inevitable
94
result-foreseen but not intended.

88. Additionally, medical standards are in place to regulate how bodies and organs may be
obtained and used after termination of life by withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures. See Gail A.
Van Norman, Another Matter of Life and Death: What Every Anesthesiologist Should Know About
the Ethical, Legal, and Policy Implications of the Non-Heart-BeatingCadaver Organ Donor, 98
ANESTHESIOLOGY 763, 764 (2003).
89. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHIcs

120-28 (4th ed. 1994).
90. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 69, at 13-14.
91. Id. at 13.
92. See id.at 14. Directive 61 states that: "Medicines capable of alleviating or suppressing
pain may be given to a dying person, even if this therapy may indirectly shorten the person's life so
long as the intent is not to hasten death." Id.
93.

See KELLY, MEDICAL CARE, supra note 63, at 15-20; MENIKOFF, supra note 70, at 241-

303.
94. See KELLY, MEDICAL CARE, supra note 63, at 16, 19. The principle of double effect holds
that an action that has both good and bad effects is right if: (1) the act is not in itself morally wrong;
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Without doubt, the history of court decisions that permit the
withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions from dying patients adds
additional credibility to the widespread acceptance of the ethical
principle of letting die. 95 Hence, the legitimacy of letting patients die
from their terminal condition in specific circumstances can be construed
as a function of the conservative ethical principle of respect for human
life that eschews killing. And the principle of letting die, also construed
as a traditional ethical principle, highlights that there is no ethical duty
from either secular or religious perspectives to keep patients alive at any
cost or as long as technically feasible. That is, both traditional religious
discourse and secular legal precedents support this ethical principle of
letting die when understood as freely and competently deciding to
forego
96
end of life care in appropriate circumstances as described above.
This ethical principle of letting die is important for dealing with
excess IVF embryos in the debate over hESC research. Even acceding to
the prudential assumption that a personal soul exists from the inception
of human life, thereby including IVF embryos, the principle of letting
die can be applied to excess IVF embryos. Insofar as embryos may not
remain viable forever in the state of cryopreservation, and do not have
donor consent for subsequent procreative use, the unwanted embryos
will not be used for procreative purpose.97 Their state of
cryopreservation can be construed reasonably as involving a medical
circumstance that is truly terminal. Hence, the ethical principle permits
withdrawal of their life-sustaining measures, that is, cryopreservation-a
process that results in the frozen embryos thawing until they die. The
ethical principle of letting die justifies allowing these embryos to die.
Just as there is no ethical duty to keep dying patients alive at any cost or
as long as technically feasible, there is no ethical duty to maintain frozen
embryos forever in a state of cryopreservation. 98 And establishing the
(2) the good effect is not the result of the bad effect; (3) the bad effect was not intended; and (4) the
good effect is not outweighed by the bad effect. Id. at 16.
95. See id. at 14.
96. For a discussion on the religious perspective of refusing life-saving medical care, see
JOHN PAUL II, supra note 42, 65; U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 69, at 13.
For a summary of the legal precedents supporting this principle, see MENIKOFF, supra note 70, at
241-303.
97.

Cf NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, I REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL 53-

54 (1994) (discussing informed consent and the use of couples' excess
research purposes as well as fertility treatments for others).
98. The exact length of time that cryopreserved embryos remain
theoretically the embryos may be stored forever, there is some evidence
of time, the embryos could no longer result in a healthy pregnancy. See
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ethical legitimacy of allowing frozen embryos to die sets the stage for
what interventions may be justified in the dying process-adopting
another traditional ethical principle, as follows.
VII.

ETHICAL PRINCIPLE OF HARVESTING FROM DECEASED PATIENTS

There is crucial relevance for combining the ethical principle of
letting die with the ethical principle of allowing organs and tissues to be
harvested from deceased patients. The relevance is that harvesting ESCs
from the thawing embryo might be feasible. If organs and tissues can be
harvested legitimately from deceased patients to accomplish substantive
good for others, such as transplantation or research, there is no reason
why a similar practice cannot be justified for thawing embryos as they
die.
The ethical debate over harvesting and transplantation continues
apace in the United States. 99 A settled aspect of the practice of
harvesting organs and tissues from deceased individuals is the use of
brain death criteria to determine the definition of death,' 00 developing
from the earlier heart-lung criteria. 10 1 The shift from the cessation of
cardiopulmonary function up to the 1960s to legally adopting brain
death criteria for organ transplantation occurred over two decades: from
the Harvard Medical School focusing on the state of irreversible coma in
1968, to focusing on irreversible brain function in 1972, to the
recognition of brain death as the legal equivalent of death in the 1981
Uniform Determination of Death Act ("UDDA"), to the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act in 1986 to connect brain death with organ donation,
to the American Academy of Neurology in 1995 confirming the use of
brain death criteria being appropriate to ethically and legally harvest
organs for transplantation. 10 2 The outcome was to confirm a fully
In Vitro Fertilization: Embryo Freezing, http://www.trmbaby.com/in-vitro/embryofreezing.shtml
(last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
99. See, e.g., MENIKOFF, supra note 70, at 443-94 (describing the debate over the definition
of death and ethical issues involved in death and organ transplantation).
100. Stuart J. Youngner, The Definition of Death, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BIOETHICS,
supra note 11, at 285, 289.
101. See MENIKOFF, supra note 70, at 462-64; Sam D. Shemie et al., Brain Death, in THE
CAMBRIDGE TEXTBOOK OF BIOETHICS, supra note 85, at 85, 86.
102. Landry & Zucker, supra note 19, at 1184-85. In documenting the various stages of the
shift from cardiopulmonary to brain death criteria, Landry and Zucker cite the following: Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (2000); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAViORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: MEDICAL,
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH (1981); Ad Hoc Comm. of the

Harvard Med. Sch. to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma,
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developed human being is organismically dead when brain function is
irretrievably lost-brain death criteria. 103 The President's Council on
Bioethics is currently preparing two new reports, one on organ
transplantation and one on
brain death, to update the 1981 report by the
10 4
President's Commission.

Combining these two ethical principles, letting die and harvesting
from deceased patients, provides a persuasive argument to permit
equivalent harvesting of ESCs from excess IVF embryos. However, the
ethics argument is relevant only if there is sufficient scientific data to
make the practice feasible. And it is the scientific perspective that raises
hurdles to be traversed if this ethical argument is to succeed. There are
two scientific hurdles that need to be engaged: the developmental status
of the frozen embryo when applying the principle of letting die; and the
lack of brain development in the thawing embryo that seems crucial for
ascertaining brain death to apply the principle of harvesting upon death.
VIII.

DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS OF THE FROZEN EMBRYO

Important research studies have been published recently on the
advantages of five-day over three-day IVF embryos for pregnancy and
delivery. 0 5 Until recently, excess embryos in IVF clinics were frozen at
the three-day stage of cellular growth (the single cleavage-stage embryo)

205 JAMA 337 (1968); Alexander Morgan Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the
Standardsfor Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87
(1973); and Quality Standards Subcomm. of the Am. Acad. of Neurology, Practice Parametersfor
DeterminingBrain Death in Adults (Summary Statement), 45 NEUROLOGY 1012 (1995).
103. Landry & Zucker, supra note 19, at 1185.
104. Diane M. Gianelli & F. Daniel Davis, News from the President'sCouncil on Bioethics, 17
KENNEDY INST. ETHics J. 397, 397-98 (2007). The white paper on the issue of determination of
death is currently available online. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, CONTROVERSIES IN
THE DETERMINATION
OF
DEATH
(2008),
available at http://www.bioethics.gov/
reports/death/determination of death report.pdf.
105. See, e.g., E.M. Kolibianakis et al., Should We Advise Patients Undergoing IVF to Start a
Cycle Leading to a Day 3 or a Day 5 Transfer?, 19 HUMAN REPROD. 2550, 2553 (2004) (asserting
that blastocysts at the five-day stage have a greater chance of implantation than an embryo at the
three-day cleavage stage); Evangelos G. Papanikolaou et al., In Vitro Fertilization with Single
Blastocyst-Stage Versus Single Cleavage-StageEmbryos, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1139, 1142 (2006)
(finding that transferring embryos at the blastocyst stage resulted in a higher likelihood of
pregnancy); Laura A. Schieve, The Promise of Single-Embryo Transfer, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1190, 1191 (2006) ("Culturing embryos for five days, to the blastocyst stage, may allow for more
accurate assessment of embryo quality and thus for enhanced selection of a high-quality embryo.").
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prior to the embryo becoming a blastocyst containing ESCs.' 06 This
scientific practice seems to present an insurmountable problem for
subsequently harvesting the stem cells in the thawing process. The threeday stage embryo is not yet a blastocyst with ESCs.' 07 Hence, a plan to
harvest ESCs would require thawing the frozen embryo and further
cultivating it to the five-day stage (the single blastocyst-stage embryo)
when it becomes a blastocyst with ESCs. This process involves thawing
the embryo, further cultivating it albeit for some days, then letting it die
to harvest the stem cells."°8
This process of thawing, growing, and letting die would be
inconsistent with an ethical argument that accedes to the prudential
assumption of an embryo having a personal soul from its inception-if
that is so, it would be unethical to let the embryo thaw, then grow in
order to let die once it developed ESCs. The paradigm of the principle of
letting patients die of their terminal disease would not pertain in such
circumstances. The critical factor in that paradigm is the removal of lifesustaining measures in order to let the patient die. The equivalent action
with regard to the frozen embryo would be to withdraw the lifesustaining measure of cryopreservation to let the embryo thaw in a dying
process.
Two relevant observations need to be highlighted. On the one hand,
an embryo frozen at the three-day stage of its cellular growth has not
become a blastocyst with stem cells for harvesting. 10 9 Hence, the
argument for combining the ethical principles in this Article-letting die
and harvesting from the deceased-could not be applied because there
are no stem cells to harvest. On the other hand, it is contrary to the
prudential assumption of the embryo having a personal soul to let the
IVF frozen embryo thaw, then develop into the blastocyst stage with
stem cells, and then be allowed to die to harvest the stem cells. That is,
manipulating the embryo in this way depicts a merely utilitarian
perspective that compromises the basic respect due to the embryo as

106. See James J. Stachecki et al., Cryopreservation of Biopsied Cleavage Stage Human
Embryos, 11 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 711, 712 (2005) (discussing standard cryopreservation
protocols and the freezing of embryos at the three-day stage).
107. See Joe Leigh Simpson, Blastomeres and Stem Cells, 444 NATURE 432, 433 (2006)
(stating that stem cells have been derived from embryos at the preimplantation blastocyst stage,
which occurs five to six days after conception).
108. See Christopher L. R. Barratt et al., Clinical Challengesin ProvidingEmbryos for StemCell Initiatives, 364 LANCET 115, 115 (2004) (describing the process of thawing and further
culturing an embryo to the blastocyst stage in order to harvest stem cells).
109. See Thomson et al., supra note 2, at 1145.
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human life with a personal soul, not to be treated merely as a means or
as an object. Until recently, the standard of care in IVF clinics of
freezing excess embryos at the three-day stage of cellular growth
presents scientific data that presents insurmountable difficulties for the
ethical argument being sought here-that is, combining the principles of
letting die and harvesting from the deceased to justify using excess IVF
embryos for hESC research.
However, recent scientific research has indicated that there is a new
standard of care for fertility treatment in IVF clinics. The new practice is
to implant the five-day single blastocyst-stage embryo rather than the
three-day single cleavage-stage embryo. 10 And the rationale is based
upon enhancing the likelihood of successful pregnancy and delivery. A
prospective, randomized, controlled trial published in 2006 concluded
that "transfer of a single blastocyst-stage embryo significantly increases
the likelihood of pregnancy and delivery as compared with transfer of a
single cleavage-stage embryo..'' l This study added to earlier results
from a different randomized, multicenter trial published in 2004 that
addressed the increased risk of premature birth and perinatal death as
being related to increased number of embryos transferred. The 2004
study concluded:
[A] single fresh-embryo transfer, followed (if there was no live birth)
by the transfer of one frozen-and-thawed embryo, results in a marked
reduction in the rate of multiple gestations but not in a substantial
reduction in the rate of pregnancy resulting in one or more live
births." 2
And finally, research has also demonstrated that "human embryonic
stem-cell lines may be derived more
efficiently from frozen blastocysts
' 13
than from frozen cleaved embryos." "
This new standard of care for IVF patients is significant insofar as
the five-day blastocyst-stage embryo has developed stem cells within the
inner cell mass. Hence, when freezing excess embryos they will already
have developed stem cells. Given this new standard of care, it becomes
increasingly plausible to adopt the ethical argument of letting the frozen
embryo die and then harvesting its stem cells. In other words, the
110. See Schieve, supranote 105, at1191.
111. Papanikolaou et al., supranote 105, at 1145.
112. Ann Thurin et al., Elective Single-Embryo Transfer Versus Double-Embryo Transfer in In
Vitro Fertilization,351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2392, 2401 (2004).
113. Chad A. Cowan et al., Derivationof Embryonic Stem-Cell Lines from Human Blastocysts,
350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1353, 1353 (2004).
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paradigm of applying the ethical principle of letting die has relevance in
the sense that if the principle can justify withdrawing life-sustaining care
from living patients, then, a fortiori, the principle can be applied to
frozen embryos. As a result, the first scientific hurdle is traversed as a
condition for the ethical argument to have traction. But there is a second
scientific hurdle dealing with brain death criteria that could block the
ethics argument on using frozen embryos.
IX.

EQUIVALENT POINT OF BRAIN DEATH IN THE THAWING EMBRYO

Insofar as the ethical principle of letting die can be applied cogently
to thaw embryos that were frozen at the blastocyst stage in order to
harvest their stem cells, the critical question that remains is when to
determine the equivalent point of brain death. The ethical principle of
harvesting organs and tissues from patients using brain death criteria is
widely accepted in our culture. 14 However, there has been a lack of
corresponding criteria for human embryos. Obviously the frozen embryo
at the blastocyst stage does not yet have brain development to facilitate
the application of brain death criteria as a condition for harvesting.1 5 So
the scientific hurdle here is whether an equivalent point of brain death
can be ascertained in the thawing embryo. But before considering this
issue, another point needs attention.
A plausible argument can be sustained in favor of permitting
harvesting of stem cells at any time in the process of letting the frozen
blastocyst die, thereby not needing an equivalent point of brain death as
required for patients. When the ethical principle of harvesting uses brain
death criteria in patients, the purpose is to ascertain scientifically the
point at which recovery of the patient is not feasible yet the cells in
organs and tissues remain viable for transplantation. And three important
issues arise from this observation.
First, the obvious difference between a thawing five-day blastocyst
and a dying patient is that both have cellular viability but only the
patient has what we recognize as fully developed human life. This
distinction is not made to argue against the blastocyst having a personal
soul-that is acceded to in this analysis. The difference between the
dying blastocyst and the dying patient as each having a personal soul
could be explained in a variety of ways, such as with regard to sentience,
114. Eun-Kyoung Choi et al., Brain Death Revisited: The Case for a National Standard, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 824, 825 (2008).
115. Miller, supra note 62, at 848.
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consciousness, etc.1 16 But more importantly, the similarity between them
is that both have viable cells in the dying process. If the viable cells can
be harvested from a patient after developed human life has died (using
brain death criteria), and if there is no equivalent of developed human
life to die in the blastocyst (so brain death criteria do not pertain), then it
seems that the blastocyst's cells can be harvested at any time in its
thawing/dying process. In contrast to this point of view, the third point
below seeks to justify harvesting the blastocyst's stem cells by a more
cautious approach, by determining the equivalent of brain death criteria.
The second issue deals with the relevance of the prudential
assumption that human life has a personal soul from its inception. This
point suggests that the ethical principle of harvesting (using brain death
criteria) appears not to be concerned about having a personal soul at the
biological end of life. Recalling the equivalency of the secular
understanding of human life as personal and the religious understanding
of human life as having a soul, considerable emphasis is given to the
prudential assumption that human life is deemed to have a personal soul
from the biological start of life. As indicated previously, there is a
plausible rationale for this prudential assumption: Because it is not
known when human life becomes personal or has a soul, caution accords
protecting human life from the earliest possible moment, its inception.
Yet, it is interesting that caution over this prudential assumption does
not appear to similarly pertain at the end of life.
If the same caution were to prevail, it is likely that harvesting may
not be permitted, legally or ethically. When a personal soul enters or
leaves human life is not known and cannot be known. If that lack of
knowledge justifies the prudential assumption at the start of life,
consistency would suggest that it also pertains at the end of human life.
And it would not be sufficient to distinguish the start/end of life
spectrum by arguing that much life lies ahead from the start and life is
petering out at the end. In each case, if human life has a personal soul,
the conservative stance about respecting human life should seek to
maintain that respect at each end of the spectrum. The argument of
consistency is this: Not knowing when life begins to have a personal
soul warrants maximum caution by protection from its biological
beginning, which is the inception of cellular development. Likewise, not
knowing when life stops having a personal soul should warrant
maximum caution by protection until its biological demise, which would
116. See Sandel, supra note 6, at 208.
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be the end of cellular development. But if we waited until the end of
cellular development, we could not harvest organs and tissues for
transplantation.
So, why does our culture so readily accept the ethical principle of
harvesting after death using brain death criteria? There is a good
explanation, though it does raise an awkward challenge for the
prudential assumption at the start of life. From both secular and religious
perspectives, harvesting after brain death criteria is deemed ethically
legitimate despite not knowing whether a personal soul remains in the
body given the continuing cellular activity required for transplantation.
The rationale appears to be that of reliance on the probabilities of
science to delineate a practical moment of death, even though death1 is
17
better understood by science as a process than as a specific moment.
Ascertaining that point has become more sophisticated over time as
science has progressed. And it may be that we will move from brain
death criteria to another standard, such as molecular markers, to
determine the moment of death of developed individuals or patients. It
appears that using the probabilities of science to determine a legal point
of death currently elicits widespread ethical support, both secular and
religious.1 18 For example, "determination of death should be made ...in
accordance with responsible and commonly accepted scientific
criteria."" 9
This common-sense approach at the end of life presents an
interesting challenge for adopting a consistent ethical stance at the start
of life with regard to respecting and protecting human life as having a
personal soul. If the prudential assumption at the start of life is applied
to the end of life, as considered above, consistency could require ending
the practice of harvesting viable organs and tissues, at least insofar as a
plausible case can be made that a personal soul remains in the dying
body until cellular activity ends. But such a stance appears to lack
prudence, especially given the practical need to determine a so-called
moment of death such as by brain death criteria. In contrast, another
perspective appears more plausible. Perhaps reliance on the probabilities
of science to determine the so-called end of life, or the moment of death,
should also pertain to determine the so-called start of life, determinations
117. See Youngner, supra note 100, at 297-98.
118. For a discussion of the religious perspective, see U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, supra note 69, at 14. The ethical acceptance of and need for standard scientific criteria to
be used in determining the point of death is discussed in Choi et al., supra note 114, at 825.
119. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 69, at 14.
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that would delineate when human life warrants respect and protection as
having a soul. If this stance were to prevail, a considerable change in
start of life ethical discourse could result.
For example, the probabilities of science may suggest the start of
life at the time of the development of the primitive streak, which occurs
around day fourteen of embryonic development. 120 The primitive streak
is constituted by "a band of cells that establishes the embryo's head-tail
and right-left orientations.' 12 1 The primitive streak is construed as a
biological threshold point insofar as it indicates when biological
individuation occurs and twinning is no longer possible.122 From this
biological point, the embryo warrants respect and protection of its
cellular development, akin to what was described previously as human
life with a personal soul.
There is sound rationale for ascertaining the moment of death using
brain death criteria, and thereby ethically justifying harvesting.
Nonetheless, this common-sense stance raises a consistency challenge
about the prudential assumption that is acceded to in this Article with
respect to the start of life. The reliance on the probabilities of science to
determine the point of death at the end of life is a contrasting prudential
assumption. So, ethical discourse on issues about the start and end of life
need to more rigorously evaluate these contrasting prudential
assumptions. However, for the purpose of this analysis, it suffices to
acknowledge that harvesting after brain death criteria is ethically
justifiable. Hence, the relevant question here is how such criteria pertain
to harvesting stem cells from thawing embryos that have no brain
development.
Third, to deploy an ethics argument that would apply the ethical
principle of harvesting after death, it would be advantageous to
determine in the thawing blastocyst an equivalent point of brain death
criteria for a human cadaver. Brain death criteria ascertain the point at
which the patient has advanced sufficiently into the dying process as to
be irretrievable while the organs and tissues of the patient remain
viable. 23 But an embryo has no brain to apply brain death criteria, nor
can cardiopulmonary function be tested. 124 By establishing brain death
120. See Okie, supra note 6, at 3; see also Sandel, supra note 6, at 209 (discussing possible
regulations that could be imposed on stem cell research in order to protect embryos, including
prohibiting research embryos from developing beyond fourteen days).
121. Okie, supra note 6, at 3.
122. Id.;
see also Mary Warnock, The Warnock Report, 291 BRIT. MED. J. 187, 188 (1985).
123. See Youngner, supra note 100, at 288.
124. See Miller, supranote 62, at 848.
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criteria, it is possible to confirm that a fully developed human being is
organismically dead. Ideally, it would be helpful if equivalent criteria
might be available to determine the organismic death of a thawing
embryo prior to the development of its central nervous system. And this
is what recent research has been able to accomplish.
This research considers death as being the loss of capacity for
continued and integrated cellular division, growth, and differentiation.
This capacity can be lost in an embryo even though its individual cells
remain alive.1 25 That is, in the embryo there is a developing organism
with cells directing the gene expression and differentiation thereby
growing as a whole, akin to how the central nervous system integrates
tissues and organs subsequently. An embryonic cell marker called Oct4
(Octamer-4) is a protein that is being investigated as an objective
criterion for ascertaining the irreversible arrest of cell integration in the
developing embryo and thereby as the equivalent to brain death
criteria. 126 Continued research is likely to refine the predictive reliability
an embryo's
of such markers to firmly establish criteria for determining
27
death when its cells remain viable for transplantation. 1
As this quest for a biochemical indicator or cell-surface marker
continues, there appears to be a reliable measure to ascertain
irreversibility or embryonic death based upon the natural history of
embryonic death. For example, in research by Donald Landry and
others, several twenty-four-hour periods of frozen embryos failing to
divide indicate organismic death, and arrested development at the
multicellular stage at a specific time seems to indicate irreversible loss
of integrated organic function, thereby presenting an indicator of the
embryo's death. 128 In further research, Landry and others concluded:
"Criteria for irreversible loss of the capacity for normal embryonic
development would provide an operational definition for the diagnosis
of embryo death consistent with the concept of death as the irreversible
loss of integrated organic function. The issue of irreversibility is a
paramount concern for any determination of death."' 129 Hence, they
proposed that "a natural history study of nonviable IVF embryos might
yield a time beyond which an embryo, having failed to divide normally

125. Landry & Zucker, supranote 19, at 1186.
126. Id. at 1185.
127. Id. at 1186.
128. Id.; Donald W. Landry et al., Hypocellularity andAbsence of Compaction as Criteriafor
Embryonic Death, I REGENERATIVE MED. 367, 369 (2006); Zhang et al., supra note 18, at 2672.
129. Landry et al., supra note 128, at 368.
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despite best efforts, never returns to the path of normal development."1 30
In other words, the criteria dealing with irreversibility adopted for
harvesting from deceased persons could be applied cogently to
harvesting live cells from dead embryos. It is also worth noting that
there is reliable evidence to indicate that the overwhelming majority of
hESCs remain viable in the thawing process under standard conditions
and also that
embryonic cell death can be managed by temperature
1
controls. 13
This remarkable hypothesis of using similar criteria dealing with
natural history indicators, like irreversibility for diagnosing death in
deceased patients and in embryos, threads the needle, so to speak, to
justify using excess IVF embryos for hESC research. And a significant
corollary should be noted. The analysis here refers to frozen embryos,
specifically justifying harvesting from the five-day blastocyst the ESCs
in the inner mass. However, this argument cannot be applied to live
embryos created by IVF procedures but not yet frozen. The argument
does not apply because the embryo at the point of creation in the IVF
process has not developed its ESCs that could be harvested by letting the
embryo die if it was unwanted. Typically unused IVF embryos are
frozen to be available for subsequent use by the prospective mother in
the event that previous embryos do not lead to pregnancy. 3 2 Moreover,
the embryo could not simply be cultivated for five days to develop into a
blastocyst in order to harvest its ESCs by letting it die-that process
would meet the same ethical opposition as described above in thawing a
three-day frozen embryo, cultivating it to become a blastocyst, and then
letting it die to harvest its stem cells.
X.

ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF A RESTRICTED BUT PRODUCTIVE
RESEARCH RESOURCE

The ethical justification in this Article is the argument for hESC
research on a very restricted yet highly productive resource. The
130. Id.
131. B.C. Heng et al., Kinetics of Cell Death of Frozen-ThawedHuman Embryonic Stem Cell
Colonies Is Reversibly Slowed Down by Exposure to Low Temperature, 14 ZYGOTE 341, 344
(2006); Boon Chin Heng et al., Loss of Viability During Freeze-Thaw of Intact and Adherent
Human Embryonic Stem Cells with Conventional Slow-Cooling ProtocolsIs PredominantlyDue to
Apoptosis Rather than CellularNecrosis, 13 J. BIOMED. SCI. 433, 439 (2006); see also Bongaerts &
Severijnen, supra note 10, at 479-80 (describing how microorganisms can exist in a state that is not
dead, but instead is both lifeless and still viable, and arguing that embryos are not completely killed
when stem cells are harvested).
132. See Hoffman et al., supranote 7, at 1063.
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resource refers to excess blastocysts frozen as five-day embryos whose
inner cell mass already contains ESCs. This resource is restricted to
embryos created in IVF clinics for fertility purposes, so it cannot be
applied to the creation of embryos for the specific purpose of research.
The resource does not include newly created embryos. However, this
highly restrictive resource could be very productive. And researchers
need a large number of hESC lines. A number of hESC lines have been
developed so far. 133 And a small number of these lines remained eligible
for federal funding based on the 2001 decision of President Bush
permitting these lines because they had been created prior to the
enactment of his policy. Although President Obama revoked the 2001
Executive Order of President Bush that restricted federal funding for
ESC research beyond these limited lines, 134 it is important to understand
the justification of President Bush's stance. This can be achieved by
appealing to another centuries-old conservative ethical principle called
the principle of material cooperation.' 35 Both President Bush and his
predecessor36 President Clinton appear to have adopted this ethical
principle.'
The point of the principle is to ascertain that there is no moral
complicity in a perceived wrongdoing, even though there is a material
connection, hence the name of the ethical principle.' 37 This principle is
perhaps one of the most commonly used ethical principles in secular and
religious discourse. 138 An illustration can indicate its common coinage.
Opponents to nuclear weapons may continue to pay their government
taxes even though a small percentage of those taxes can be materially
connected to funding for nuclear weapons-research, creation,
maintenance, and deployment. That is, when paying government taxes,
there is sufficient opposition to and distance from the perceived
wrongdoing, and there is sufficient good being accomplished-that is,

133. Cowan et al., supra note 113, at 1353 (stating that fifteen human stem cell lines are
available for public research use).
134. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 46 (Mar. 9, 2009).
135. See Charles E. Curran, Cooperation: Toward a Revision of the Concept and its
Application, 41 LINACRE Q. 152, 153-55 (1984); Neil Scolding, CooperationProblems in Science:
Use of Embryonic/FetalMaterial, in COOPERATION, COMPLICITY AND CONSCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN
HEALTHCARE, SCIENCE, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 105, 111 (Helen Watt ed., 2005).

136. Magill, supranote 26, at 720-22.
137. Id. at 721-22.
138. See, e.g., Scolding, supra note 135, at 11l (applying the principle of cooperation to the
stem cell debate). See generally Curran, supra note 135 (discussing the principle of cooperation
from a religious perspective and exploring its applicability in the medical context).
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paying legitimate taxes that otherwise also contribute to the common
good of society.
Hence, the principle of material cooperation permits use, including
research and medical treatments, of resources that may have been
obtained unethically. For example, in religious discourse, when many
reliable vaccines were developed from aborted fetal tissue, many pro-life
patients and families who opposed abortion worried about their ethical
complicity in the perceived wrongdoing of abortion. However, the
principle of cooperation permits the use of such vaccines, despite their
genesis, conditional upon the following: being opposed to the perceived
wrongdoing; being sufficiently distant from the perceived wrongdoing
as to be unable to prevent it; and being able to accomplish significant
good by using the vaccines. 139 However, the vaccines*application of this
ethical principle by traditional religious doctrine does raise an awkward
question: Will there be a similar occurrence in years ahead regarding
hESC therapies that may be developed-the recurrence being
antecedently opposing hESC research in principle yet subsequently
being amenable to using hESC therapies when they are developed? That
stance may not be plausible to everyone, thereby inviting a
reconsideration of practice at either end of the spectrum in the cause of
consistency: to accept hES research now or to reject using hESC
therapies later.
Notwithstanding the above difficulty, the principle of material
cooperation can present a justification for President Bush permitting
federal research funding on the ESC lines that were created prior to his
2001 policy. 140 However, all of these approved lines were developed
using mouse cultures. Although these lines are helpful for studies in
basic science, the mouse contamination means they should never be used
to develop clinical therapies for humans, such as developing lines that
model specific diseases to develop human treatments.' 14 In addition, a

139. See Daniel P. Maher, Vaccines, Abortion, and Moral Coherence, 2 NAT'L CATH.
BIOETHICS Q. 60-62 (2002). See generally Edward J. Furton, Vaccines Originatingin Abortion, 24

ETHics & MEDICS 3 (1999) (discussing potential controversies over the use of vaccines developed
from aborted fetal material and stating that the use of these vaccines by Catholics is not cooperation
with the practice of abortion because it is so far removed from the act of abortion and because
refusal of the vaccine may pose a fatal risk to the individual); James F. Keenan & Thomas R.
Kopfensteiner, The Principle of Cooperation, HEALTH PROGRESS, Apr. 1995, at 23-26 (describing
the theory of cooperation and its implications).
140. Magill, supra note 26, at 720-22.
141.

See generally George Q. Daley, Missed Opportunities in Embryonic Stem-Cell Research,

351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 627 (2004) (arguing that the ban on federal funding for the development of
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limited number of hESC lines have been developed since 2001 by
independent funding. 142 Fortunately, many of these stem cell lines are
not contaminated by mouse cultures, and hence can be helpful for
research and the future development of treatments and therapies for
humans. Nonetheless, this small number of ESC lines is prone to the
typical problems of maintaining any cell line over time, and hence need
to be replaced by others. 143 And, naturally, a larger diversity of stem cell
lines can contribute advantageously to continuing hESC research.
So, there will be an ongoing need for ESCs to develop noncontaminated lines for hESC research.' 44 The narrow focus of this
Article has been to present a cautious ethical argument that justifies
using excess IVF frozen blastocysts as a narrow but potentially very
productive research resource. Until 2009, using this resource was
opposed by secular doctrine based on the 2001 policy of President
Bush-a policy that, as mentioned previously, President Obama revoked
in 2009.145 Some religious doctrine continues this opposition.146 There
has been hope that ESCs may be obtained by other means than
destroying the human blastocyst, such as by using iPSCs. 14 7 But as
discussed previously, human iPSCs have the potential of developing into
a human fetus, akin to the developmental capacity of a blastocyst. 148 As
a result, the initial wave of hopeful optimism among conservative voices
may dissipate with this emerging understanding of the biological
capacity of iPSCs.
Another way of obtaining ESCs is that of somatic cell nuclear
transfer ("SCNT"), 149 which elicits robust debate on the relation between

new stem cell lines has severely hindered biomedical research and the development of cures for
genetic defects).
142. Seventeen such lines were developed with the approval from a Harvard University
institutional review board. Cowan et al., supra note 113, at 1353. For a discussion on the private
institutions that have provided funding for stem cell research, see Stephen S. Hall, Stem Cells: A
Status Report, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 16, 18.
143. See John Gearhart, New Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Lines-More Is Better, 350 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1275, 1275 (2004).

144. Id. at 1276.
145. See Bush, supra note 26, at 214; see also Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 46 (Mar.
9, 2009).
146.

See CONGREGATION, DIGNITAS PERSONAE, supra note 25, § 32.

147. Magill & Neaves, supra note 56, at 24.
148. Id. at 26.
149. See Woo Suk Hwang et al., Patient-SpecificEmbryonic Stem Cells Derivedfrom Human
SCNTBlastocysts, 308 SCIENCE 1777, 1778 (2005).
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science and ethics. 5 ° Substantive progress has been made recently in
increasing the efficiency of developing ESC lines from human
blastocysts. A recent study reports that such an increase in efficiency
means "the line has been crossed between viewing the derivation of
human nuclear-transfer ESCs as an experimental system and viewing it
as a viable clinical proposition."'1 51 However, SCNT is unacceptable to
many who uphold conservative doctrine, such as President Bush and
many faith traditions. They oppose SCNT because they construe the
cloned embryo as having a personal soul and hence, it cannot be
destroyed for hESC research. And they excoriate any effort to use a
human SCNT embryo, because it is a cloned organism, for research or
for reproductive purposes. 52 It should be noted that there is a consensus
in the scientific community to embrace SCNT exclusively for research,
adopting the technology only to create cells and never to create
babies. 153 Even though scientists ardently seek to obtain federal funding
for using SCNT technology only for hESC research, 54 this Article does
not engage this topic because it requires the creation and intentional
destruction of a human blastocyst which stands counter to acceding to
the prudential assumption mentioned previously. However, this Article
does not adopt a position on the ethics of SCNT.
There are other techniques being explored to obtain ESCs and they
have been considered by the President's Council on Bioethics, though
none have been adopted yet by the Council. 55 One technique is singleblastomere biopsy whereby a single cell, a blastomere, is removed from
an eight-cell stage blastocyst.' 56 The blastomere is cultured to develop an
ESC line and the remaining seven-cell embryo would be implanted for
reproduction. 57 And prior experiments with mice indicate the feasibility
150.

See generally Rudolf Jaenisch, Human Cloning-The Science and Ethics of Nuclear

Transplantation,351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2787 (2004) (discussing the ethical implications of nuclear
transfer and focusing on how the technique is used in the cloning process).
151. Perry, supra note 3, at 87-88.
152. See CONGREGATION, DIGNITAS PERSONAE, supra note 25, §§ 28-30; McHugh, supra note
17, at 210.
153. See McHugh, supra note 17, at 210.
154. See Phimister, supra note 35, at1647-48.
155.

See generally PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF HUMAN

PLURIPOTENT STEM CELLS (2005) (reporting on a number of different potential sources of stem
cells, including organismically dead embryos, somatic cell differentiation, biological artifacts, and
blastomere extraction from living embryos); Bonnie Steinbock, Alternative Sources of Stem Cells,

HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 2005, at 24 (discussing the President's Council on Bioethics' report
and summarizing the alternative sources of stem cells proposed by the Council).
156. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supranote 155, at 24-25.
157. Id.
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of this approach. 158 But substantive problems arise when applying this
technique to humans, both scientific, due to the complexity involved,
and ethical, due to the uncertainty of the remaining seven-cell embryo
59
after implantation always developing into a normal human baby.'
However, it should be noticed that the procedure is based on the
increasingly practiced technique of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
("PGD"). The practice of PGD removes a human blastomere for testing
purposes and implants the blastocyst minus that blastomere, and more
than 1000 healthy babies have been born.' 60 Also, there have been
successful experiments demonstrating that hESCs can be derived from
the single blastomere.161
Another technique being explored to obtain ESCs is called altered
nuclear transfer ("ANT"), such as that proposed by Professor Hurlbut on
the President's Council on Bioethics.' 62 The technique creates an
embryo whose gene for normal development is inactivated from the
outset. A similar phenomenon occurs in the natural process of human
reproduction. A proof-of-principle study was undertaken successfully in
mice that effectively tested the ANT hypothesis. 163 In the mice
experiment, through SCNT, the technique inactivated a developmental
gene (Cdx2) in the somatic cell nucleus before combining with the
enucleated egg.' 64 That gene is necessary for trophectoderm
development (to form the outer layer of the blastocyst, the trophoblast)
that enables the embryo to implant in the uterine wall.' 65 As a result of
this technique, cloned blastocysts cannot develop beyond the blastocyst
stage, although they develop the inner cell mass from which their ESCs
can be harvested. 166 Some argue that the alteration fundamentally
changes the structural capacity to develop as a human embryo, thereby

158. Young Chung et al., Embryonic and Extraembryonic Stem Cell Lines Derivedfrom Single
Mouse Blastomeres, 439 NATURE 216, 218 (2006).
159. See id.; Nick Strelchenko, Morula-Derived Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 9 REPROD.
BIOMED. ONLINE 623, 628 (2004).
160. Steinbock, supra note 155, at 25.
161. Irina Klimanskaya et al., Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Single
Blastomeres, 444 NATURE 481, 484 (2006).
162. William B. Hurlbut, Altered Nuclear Transfer as a Morally Acceptable Means for the
Procurement of Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 211, 212, 220 (2005).
163. Alexander Meissner & Rudolf Jaenisch, Generation of Nuclear Transfer-Derived
PluripotentES Cellsfrom Cloned Cdx2-DeficientBlastocysts, 439 NATURE 212, 214-15 (2006).
164. Id. at 213.
165. Id.; see also COHEN, supra note 15, at 52 (describing Meissner and Jaenisch's mouse
experiment).
166. Meissner & Jaenisch, supra note 163, at 212.
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causing the resulting organism to lack the moral status of a human
embryo, even though it can develop hESCs. 167 Again there are
substantive problems that arise when applying this technique to humans,
both scientific problems, based on the complexities of shifting the
research model from mice to human experiments, and ethical problems,
as the method could not guarantee that every such 8 entity would be
incapable of normal development as a human embryo.16
Neither of these two techniques (single-blastomere biopsy or ANT)
offers an immediate capacity for developing ESC lines that would
readily resolve conservative ethical concerns about safeguarding the
human embryo. Hence, this Article focuses upon providing an ethical
argument to justify using excess IVF blastocysts for hESC research by
adopting a cautious posture of deploying two traditional ethical
principles. Each principle would be inadequate on its own to justify the
argument. The two ethical principles are: the principle of letting die and
the ethical principle of harvesting after death. By combining these
principles, this Article has provided a robust justification and strenuous
support for the use of IVF frozen blastocysts in hESC research.
Moreover, the analysis is submitted as a development of doctrine,
secular and religious alike, rather than a rejection of the current doctrine
that opposes this use of IVF embryos for hESC research.
XI.

CONCLUSION

An explanation of the difference between developing and rejecting
the conservative doctrine on opposing the use of excess IVF frozen
embryos for hESC research should sharpen the point of the argument.
The analysis clearly accedes to the prudential assumption that human life
has a personal soul from its inception, even though serious flaws have
been exposed in that assumption. This Article justifies using IVF
blastocysts for hESC research in a manner that does not repudiate the
rationale underlying the conservative doctrine that opposes the research.
The argument could have sought to reject the current doctrine by a more
persuasive appeal to other traditional ethical principles. But doing so
would needlessly forfeit the central insight of the conservative doctrine:
167. Hurlbut, supranote 162, at 226.
168. See W. Malcolm Bymes, Partial Trajectory: The Story of the Altered Nuclear TransferOocyte Assisted Reprogramming (ANT-OAR) Proposal, 74 LINACRE Q. 50, 53 (2007); Carina
Dennis & Erika Check, 'Ethical' Routes to Stem Cells Highlight Political Divide, 437 NATURE

1076, 1077 (2005); Davor Solter, Politically Correct Human Embryonic Stem Cells?, 353 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2321, 2323 (2005).
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that human life is construed to have a personal soul from its inception
and therefore elicits not only respect but also protection from destruction
even for the noble cause of medical research.
The central insight of the conservative doctrine is that excess IVF
embryos should not be destroyed despite the fact that they will not lead
to a pregnancy and will die eventually (the so-called practical usefulness
argument of using them for some good), irrespective of the urgent need
for treatments by so many sick or diseased or debilitated patients (the socalled compassionate argument of assisting the needy), and
notwithstanding the high hopes of medical research (the so-called noble
cause argument of human flourishing). This Article has not adopted any
of these widely used claims to justify a shift from opposing to
supporting the use of excess IVF embryos for hESC research.
Instead, this Article has acceded to the prudential assumption in the
conservative doctrine and thereby rejects interventions that intend or
seek to destroy the frozen blastocyst for whatever reason, just as medical
care refuses to kill any patient no matter how sick or close to death. The
analysis adopts the paradigm of a dying patient in a terminal condition to
highlight the practice that both letting the patient die and harvesting after
death, using brain death criteria, is not only ethically justifiable but a
world away from killing or murdering the patient. Similarly, letting
frozen embryos thaw to die and then harvesting their ESCs, after
adopting the equivalent practice of using brain death criteria, is a world
away from killing or destroying the blastocyst. And just as a patient or
family can voluntarily permit the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
and harvesting after death, similarly informed consent should be sought
from the biological parents to use excess IVF frozen blastocysts for
hESC research, whether the research is federally funded or not.169
In other words, this Article submits an argument based on the
development of doctrine rather than being an outright rejection of the
conservative doctrine, both secular and religious. The central stance of
the conservative doctrine continues to prevail in this new argument:
acceding to the prudential assumption that assigns to human life from its
inception a personal soul that warrants the embryo being protected from
intentional destruction. And the novelty in this analysis is a function of
ethical imagination-to combine the traditional ethical principle of
169. Robert Streiffer, Informed Consent and Federal Funding for Stem Cell Research,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 2008, at 40, 42. The development of consent in this field was based
on the recommendations of the National Institutes of Health. See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra
note 97, at 53-54.
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respecting human life in the conservative doctrine with complementary
traditional ethical principles (justifiably letting die and harvesting after
death), adopting the paradigm of a dying patient. The outcome is to
propose a developed doctrine that supports using excess IVF frozen
blastocysts for hESC research in a process that indeed entails their death,
but not by seeking or intending to kill or destroy them-just as letting a
patient die and harvesting organs does not involve either seeking or
intending the patient's death. This new stance is a genuine development
of the previous doctrine, as an oak tree from the acorn, even though
there are opposing outcomes. The nuance of the argument is that the
shift from opposing to supporting the research in question emerges as a
function not of rejection but of development. In today's complex ethical
discourse, the gentle winds and hermeneutic of developing doctrine can
result in refreshing and invigorating change.
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